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1. Setting the context – overview of corruption in 
infrastructure delivery in Georgia   
 
1.1 Decline in infrastructure service delivery and corruption in the 
1990s and early 2000s 
The transition from centrally planned to market economies resulted in drastic changes in 
the political, economic and social systems throughout Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union.  Rapid trends of decentralization, challenges in institution building, fiscal 
crises and a tremendous growth in poverty were experienced across the region during 
the1990s.   
Georgia was no exception to these common trends.  Market reforms, the emergence of 
private sector institutions and private property ownership, the establishment of a legal 
framework for decentralized decision-making and public participation all changed the way 
in which Georgia was governed during the 1990s.  However, decentralization and 
democratic reforms failed to make public and local institutions transparent, accountable 
and responsive to local needs.  Public agencies often lacked efficiency, effectiveness and 
professional capacity in addressing public objectives.  At the same time, growing social 
and economic problems in Georgian cities resulted in a drastic decline in the quality of 
public services and a deterioration of physical infrastructure.  Distrust of central and local 
governments became endemic.  The erosion and, in many cases near-collapse of public 
services in Georgia since the early 1990s has become a reality in many urban areas (see 
Vardosanidze, 2002).   
By the late 1990s, corruption had been acknowledged as one of the key impediments to 
delivering improved infrastructure services in Georgia, as it kept public resources from 
being used efficiently and prevented public preferences from being addressed.  A 
presentation by the Georgian Working Group for Partners during the Transition-II 
Conference in 2001 commented as follows:  
‘Corruption has become a foundation of the Georgian state, hindering the 
country’s economic development, undermining its international prestige and 
reputation and eroding the moral foundations of civil society.’ (Transparency 
As One of The Most Effective Anticorruption Measures, anon, 2001: 1)   
In many ways, corruption governed the informal relationships that existed between 
various institutional players at the central and local level in Georgia.  In 1999, Georgia 
was ranked by Transparency International as 85th among 99 surveyed countries, with 
one of the lowest Corruption Perception Indexes (CPI)1 (Transparency International, 
1999).  In the period 1990–2003, this widespread corruption was evidenced by number of 
surveys conducted by local and international organizations.  The effects of corruption 
were felt most by the poor – the World Bank and GORBI oint survey of 1998 suggests 
that while overall roughly 2.8 per cent of households’ incomes went to pay bribes, some 
evidence suggests that poorer households pay a larger share of their incomes in bribes 
than richer households.  This issue requires special attention given the fact that during 
                                                   
1
 Transparency Internationals’ Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries in terms of the 
degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. CPI ranges 
between 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).   
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last couple of years, over 50 per cent of the population in Georgia has remained below 
the poverty line.  Some of the studies also showed favouritism, bribes, fraud and state 
capture all associated with delivery of infrastructure services.  A high tolerance of 
corruption and lack of administrative remedies to keep local institutions accountable, 
transparent and responsive have lead to a strong sense of impunity among local officials; 
this in turn has created growing public distrust and nihilism towards local institutions.   
While there are many publications on how corruption affects growth, foreign direct 
investment, trade and public sector finances, there is little evidence on how it affects 
infrastructure performance.  Although it is widely recognized that corruption damages the 
performance of public infrastructure (see Estache, 2004), there is little applied or even 
theoretical research on this topic. 
 
1.2 Addressing corruption after the Rose Revolution 
Despite the fact that the Government of Georgia under the leadership of the President 
Eduard Shevardnadze (who ruled the country from 1992 and was president from 1995) 
recognized corruption as key impediment to the country’s development, it completely 
failed to implement any concrete actions to address the problem.  As a result, no 
progress was made until after the Rose Revolution (which took place in 2003) in terms of 
delivery of improved public services and clear actions oriented towards reducing 
corruption.  For the post-Rose Revolution government under the leadership of the 
President Mikhail Saakashvili, alleviating poverty and combating corruption became 
major public objectives linked directly to improving urban wellbeing. 
The two years since the Revolution in November 2003 have demonstrated that one of the 
key tasks of the government in its strategy to fight corruption was the implementation of 
governance reform in the public and local sectors.  The government’s anticorruption 
strategy attacked corruption from numerous directions and earned substantial results.  
The strategic aim of the authorities continues to be to establish an efficient, professional, 
decent and transparent civil sector; this will serve to protect democratic principles and 
improve the quality of life for citizens.  Such improvement may be achieved through 
executing institutional reforms at all levels of government – central as well as local. 
The new government has recognized that systemic and widespread corruption 
undermines the institutional and procedural foundations upon which accountability 
mechanisms lie.  Therefore, increasing accountability represents a key element to 
anticorruption campaigns. Numerous studies have evidenced that in many ways 
corruption governs the informal relationships that currently exist between various 
institutional players at the local level in Georgia.  Explicit, high-level management and 
commitment in the fight against corruption were translated into specific, concrete 
initiatives by central and local authorities through the introduction of new transparency 
and accountability mechanisms at the central, municipal and utility levels.  President 
Saakashvili believes that ‘A new accountable government… produced with all the 
complexities that democracy involves can be far more efficient than the authoritarian, 
corrupt, kleptocratic regimes that we (Georgia) had previously’.2 
 
                                                   
2
 Officials Laud Millennium Aid Agreement. The Messenger, September 14, 2005, p.8. 
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1.3 Contents of the study 
This paper represents a report on three case studies of the introduction of anticorruption 
mechanisms in the provision of infrastructure services in Georgia.  All three case studies 
look at reforms that were introduced in 2004; the first two are initiatives of the Tbilisi 
municipality, while the third one is a nationwide reform.  The three mechanisms reviewed 
in this study are as follows: 
(1) Improved water billing introduced by the Tbilisi municipality.  This case study looked 
to identify corruption experiences in water service delivery, and the structure of incentives 
and opportunities for corruption in the pre-2004 period.  The study also attempted to 
review the new billing and payment system introduced in 2004 by the new municipal 
government.  In addition, it aimed to assess public perceptions towards the pre- and 
post-2004 billing and collection systems.  Finally, it studied the implications of corruption 
on the quality of water services provided to the population and on the quality of life of the 
population, specifically the poor.   
(2) The introduction of new funding arrangements for the repair of multi-storey residential 
buildings.  This initiative of the Tbilisi municipality aimed at reducing corruption in the 
maintenance and repair of common areas of multi-storey apartment stock, as well as 
increasing the efficiency of the system in order to target more buildings and projects.  
The case study aimed to measure the effects of the new initiative on the efficiency of the 
system of maintenance and repair, and to identify public perceptions towards the 
previous and current systems.  In addition, the study intended to establish a link between 
the new funding arrangements for repair of multi-storey apartment stock and quality of life 
of residents, especially the poor. 
(3) The introduction of new mechanisms of property registration across the country.  This 
study intended to look at newly introduced accountability and transparency mechanisms 
and improvements in the system resulting from such reforms. It also attempted to 
establish a link between improved property rights registration and increasing 
opportunities for the population, especially the poor.  
It is important to emphasize the fact that the Tbilisi municipal government has been the 
one municipality in Georgia that has attacked corruption in a major way.  Tbilisi is the 
capital of Georgia with a population over 1 million – about 20 to 25 per cent of the 
country’s overall population.  Therefore, two of three reviewed cases encompass Tbilisi-
level initiatives.  The report is divided into three major parts to reflect the three cases 
named above. 
1.4 Methodology of the study 
The methodology of this case study was selected to allow the contextual analysis of real 
life situations based on multiple sources of evidence and a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research techniques.   
Specifically, for the water billing and collection case the applied methodology included: a 
survey of 160 residential customers of Tbilisi Water Utility (TWU), who are residents of 
Tbilisi’s multi-apartment housing stock; and interviews with customers (ten interviews), 
TWU’s new management (five interviews), municipal officials (two interviews), NGO 
leaders (two interviews) and academics (two interviews).   
Survey respondents were households owning apartments in three different multi-storey 
apartment buildings, which were selected in different residential districts of the city 
(relatively high-income residential areas, as well as lower-income areas).  Respondents 
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were selected from all sizes of apartments (studio, one-bedroom, two-bedroom and three 
bedroom apartments).  The survey was conducted by the specifically designed 
questionnaire.  Both the questionnaire survey and interviews aimed to identify corruption 
experiences in water service delivery and the structure of incentives and opportunities for 
corruption in the pre-2004 period; they also tried to assess public perceptions towards 
post-2004 water service delivery.  Respondents for the in-depth interviews were selected 
from residents of the same pilot buildings, two or three residents from each building.  
They were selected randomly from those who agreed to participate in interviews. 
The multi-storey apartment building maintenance repair study also used methodology 
that included a survey of 120 respondents – residents from two multi-storey apartment 
buildings that were repaired under the old system in 2003, and two other buildings that 
were repaired under the current system in 2004.  While the selection of the buildings was 
based on the latest date of their repair and maintenance, respondents from within the 
buildings were chosen at random.  By including respondents of various buildings, the 
study tried to compare client satisfaction between the buildings and so compare the 
effectiveness of two systems.  The survey was conducted by specifically designed 
questionnaires – one for respondents residing in the buildings repaired under the old 
system and another for respondents residing in buildings repaired under the current 
system.  In addition, interviews were conducted with representatives of Tbilisi 
municipality (three interviews), the district government (three interviews), Tbilisi Corps 
(one interview), NGO leaders (five interviews) and representatives of the homeowners’ 
association (HOA; three interviews). Respondents from the HOA were selected from 
residents of the pilot buildings, one from each of the three pilot buildings in this study.  
They were selected randomly from those who agreed to participate in interviews. 
The third case study involved desk-research alone in order to identify improvements in 
the system of property rights registration, a reduction in corruption incentives and 
opportunities and potential benefits to the livelihoods of the population.  
All three case studies tested the application of new transparency and accountability 
mechanisms in the delivery of public and municipal services by comparing realities and 
experiences under the previous and the new systems. 
1.5 Summary 
Based on these case studies, the experience of post-revolutionary Georgia suggests that 
it is essential to translate an anticorruption policy into highly specific mechanisms at the 
institutional level.  Despite the fact that the government had an anticorruption policy 
before the revolution, this had not been translated into the concrete accountability 
mechanisms.  Utility- and institution-level reforms, supported by the high level of political 
will to combat corruption, resulted in improved efficiency of public service delivery to the 
Georgian population, including the poor.  The three case reports outlined below suggest 
that the introduction of even relatively simple (easy to design, introduce and implement; 
cost-efficient and inexpensive) mechanisms of accountability and transparency in the 
delivery of public services result in a substantial increase in the efficiency of services 
through decreasing corruption and improving public opinions towards the public and 
municipal institutions concerned.   
The report makes an assumption that while improved accountability and increased 
transparency lead to improved public services, such improvements also lead to 
incentives for the population to pay for services.  In this way, improved collections 
translate into more funds being available to deliver services, leading to indirect benefits 
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for the population, including the poor.  However, the report also recognizes that the direct 
effects of reforms in the provision of public services may to some degree hurt the poor as 
people on low incomes may fail to obtain services; such effects should be considered 
and addressed by the state or local government.  At the same time, the report recognizes 
that it is somehow premature to discuss the pitfalls of reforms as the reforms were 
introduced in 2004 and are still under implementation. 
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2. Improved water billing by Tbilisi Water Utility 
   
2.1 Current status of water supply in Tbilisi 
Since 1990, the water supply and sanitation sector has experienced a constant 
deterioration in its ability to provide continued, reliable and safe water and wastewater 
services in Georgia’s cities, including Tbilisi.  In the case of Tbilisi Water Utility (TWU), its 
networks and treatment plants reached a state of a severe disrepair due to poor 
planning, inadequate design, the low quality of materials and equipment used and a lack 
of appropriate periodic maintenance.  Inefficiency in the sector adversely affects costs of 
production and results in over consumption of water resources and energy.  While TWU 
has identified all elements of rehabilitation, repair and upgrading needed by Tbilisi’s 
water system, the utility lacks funds to cover these needs.  Low tariffs and low collection 
rates contribute to a consistent inability to recover costs.  
TWU provides water and sewerage services to about one million people in Tbilisi – about 
20 per cent of entire country’s population, with almost 50 per cent of these living below 
poverty level.  In 2004 TWU had 343,179 residential customers (households).  The 
population pays a fixed tariff equal to 1.2GEL (Georgian Lari; approximately US$0.7) per 
person per month for water and sanitation services.  Current tariffs for domestic 
consumers are estimated to be about one tenth of actual costs so are well below cost-
recovery rates.  These low tariffs are subsidized by the municipality.   
Per capita water production is extremely high, between 800 and 960 litres per capita per 
day (l/c/d).  This is partly the result of wasteful consumer habits, which are encouraged 
by artificially low prices and the absence of metering, and partly the result of high 
physical losses.  Nearly 50 per cent of leakages may be attributable to defective 
plumbing fixtures and domestic water fittings, such as faucets and toilet flushing systems.  
There is essentially no metering of actual consumption levels and bills are assessed on a 
flat rate basis.  Over 90 per cent of the municipality has never been metered.  
An intermittent and unpredictable water supply is common in many districts of Tbilisi, 
contributing to water quality problems. The deteriorated distribution system exposes 
consumers to the risk of cross-contamination with sewage from leaking sewer lines, 
which results in water-borne diseases; confirmed cases include the 1998 Tbilisi epidemic 
of amoebiasis. Therefore, improving the quality of services and ensuring their 
sustainability is a high priority for the city government. 
The Leakage Pilot Study Report of 1998 (Georgian Technical University) identified that 
45 per cent of the water supplied was lost through leakages.  In addition to the very high 
leakage rates, the remaining per capita consumption of water represents a daily usage 
that is significantly higher than in other European cities.  The major part of this very high 
consumption rate represents wastage.  Thus, part of the problem is leakage as a result of 
life-expired and damage assets, but a significant part results from the attitude, formed 
during the Soviet era, that water is a free good of infinite supply.  TWU identified leakage 
and waste as issues of critical importance, crucial to both the financial and the technical 
recovery of the utility.     
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2.2 Poverty and water services 
Georgia’s Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Program, adopted by Georgia in 
2003 as a major policy document, calls for radical reform in water supply and sewage 
treatment in order to improve the quality of services provided to the population.  The 
measures outlined include: granting greater independence to water supply services 
providers; enhancing financial planning and management capacity; the establishment of 
sustained financial mechanisms to secure water supply systems and mobilization of the 
necessary funds for their repair and maintenance; and initiating the involvement of the 
private sector into the management of water supply and sewage systems in major cities.   
The Millennium Development Goals for Georgia also call for the implementation of these 
measures given that they will aid attainment of the Goals by providing 
sustainable/improved access to drinking water for an increased number of people, 
including the poor.    
 
2.3 Management and accountability 
In 2004 and 2005 following the Rose Revolution, all high-level officials were dismissed 
and new officials were appointed, including key positions in large state and municipal 
enterprises.  Tbilisi Water Utility was no exception to this process and by 2005 a new 
supervisory board had been appointed with its key tasks to increase the efficiency of the 
system and improve the quality and quantity of water provided.  Prior to the appointment 
of the new management team, collection rates were as low as 30–35 per cent. 
Since the 1990s, households had been provided with incentives and opportunities to 
become involved in widespread corruption in terms of avoiding payments for various 
infrastructure services such as electricity, gas and water.  Although metering of electricity 
and gas supplies decreased the opportunities for such deals, corrupt arrangements 
remained common in the water sector until April 2004. This was when a new billing and 
collection system was introduced as part of the framework of the major anticorruption 
reforms initiated after the Rose Revolution.   
 
2.4 Review of the pre-2004 water billing and payment system 
The World Bank and GORBI joint survey of 2000 found that 3 per cent of expected 
monthly unofficial payments could be attributed to local water companies.  During the old 
system of water billing, customers did not receive bills for their water payments.  Indeed, 
bills did not exist.  TWU had two methods of collection: (1) through assigned persons, so-
called ‘outreach collectors’, or (2) through chairs of housing cooperatives. The latter 
collected various utility fees, but unlike collectors their involvement was limited to their 
building alone.  Collectors meanwhile were hired on a contract basis by TWU and were 
responsible for walking from door to door and collecting service fees in cash from 
customers in their designated areas.  If the customer paid, then the outreach collector 
registered the payments in his or her book and left a receipt of payment with the 
customer.  If the customer refused to pay, there was no way to enforce the payment.  
The collectors would then turn in collected money to TWU’s accounts office.   
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This system, which was based on face-to-face dealings between collectors and 
customers and cash payments, encouraged opportunities for corruption at several 
stages. These included:   
1. A deal between the customer and collector to arrange a reduced payment, part of 
which was paid as a bribe to the collector.  For instance, if a four-person 
household had to pay 24GEL (US$14 equivalent) to the collector (4.8GEL each 
month for services over five months), the customer might negotiate paying just 50 
per cent, of which half would go into the collector’s pocket and only 25 per cent 
would reach the service provider;  
2. Fraud by the collector (recording a lower amount than was collected overall); and 
3. A deal between the company’s accounts office and the collector – in this case, 
the cashier recording a lower amount in the company’s books than the collector 
delivered. 
This system failed to include any mechanism of accountability or transparency in the 
process; by contrast, it was arranged in such a way as to provide opportunities for corrupt 
practices and money leakage from the system. There was no mechanism for 
reconciliation of the following (also see Figure 1): 
1. That the household really paid the amount it owed, rather than negotiating a 
reduced payment with the collector;  
2. That the collected sum recorded in the collector’s book was the actual amount 
paid; 
3. That the amount recorded in the company’s book was the amount delivered to 
the cashiers’ office. 
 
Figure 1. Corruption opportunities with the old billing and payment system 
                                 $                                         $                                      $ 
  
        Customer                         TWU                                 TWU                                 TWU Bank 
        account                               collector     cashier                              account 
 
 
                                                                                              
 -$ (payment to reduce bill)                -$ (fraud by collector)        -$ (fraud by cashier) 
 
 
     Legend:          
               Opportunities for corruption 
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2.5 Corruption incentives and opportunities 
 
While only 2 per cent of respondents admitted to such arrangements with the collectors 
under the previous system, 51 per cent claimed to be aware of such opportunities. 
 
Figure 2. Effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the population, including the 
poor 
 
 
Corruption and money leakage from the system 
 
 
Low collection rates by TWU 
 
 
Lack of financial resources in TWU 
 
 
Inability to address system needs and 
provide 24-hour quality services to population 
 
 
Population (especially in low-income areas of city) 
receiving poor water supply services 
 
 
The non-transparent and inefficient collection system created opportunities for money 
leakage from the water system, which in turn had a substantial negative impact on the 
quality of services and therefore on the livelihoods of customers.  Water infrastructure 
has depreciated because of the lack of funds to cover its urgent repair and rehabilitation 
needs, and this has resulted in an irregular water supply in some parts in the city.  Such 
unreliable water services have had a direct impact on the livelihoods of the poor in 
particular, because they tend to live in those districts of Tbilisi that suffer such problems 
(see Figure 2). 
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2.6  Introduction of the new system 
Following the Rose Revolution of November 2003, major anticorruption reforms were 
launched across the country by the new president and government.  Defeating corruption 
has become a major slogan and cornerstone of the reforms, which were planned in all 
areas of Georgia’s social and economic life and at the central and local levels.  
Institutional reforms were oriented towards improved governance through the introduction 
of transparent and efficient mechanisms and new systems of accountability. 
 
Figure 3. System change in 2004 
Before May 2004 
               (Opportunities for corruption) 
 
       Customer                           Company’s                        Company’s                          Bank 
       (approached      -$              collector          -$               cashier           -$                 (TWU                    
        by collector)                 account) 
 
 
After May 2004 
                                                 (No opportunities for corruption) 
        Customer                                                                                                         Bank              
        (receives                                                       (TWU            
 bill)                                                                                                  account)      
 
 
With common understanding of the fact that the existing system of fee collection for water 
and municipal services was offering high incentives and opportunities for corruption and 
that system was severely corrupt as a result, the municipality made a major decision to 
introduce transparency and accountability into the billing and payment collection system 
in Tbilisi’s water sector.  In order to introduce the necessary reforms, the municipality 
appointed a new board of directors and financial management team.  The reforms aimed 
to improve water services through mobilizing an increase in funds from improved 
collection rates. Such improvements would result from reducing corruption, which itself 
was to be achieved through streamlining the billing and payment process (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Detailed description of the new system 
 
Entry of the payment liability in the billing system in the service centre 
 
 
System automatically  
updates debit account 
 
 
 
Delivery of printed             Printing             Database prepares bill 
bills to district                    of invoices         based on update of                       Expenditure      
units                                  account                                                    
                                                            
 
 
 
Delivery of printed bills            Transaction reflected                Record in management 
to customers                            on customer’s account             billing and corporate 
system 
 
 
 
Payment by                    Closure of debit            Accountant receives          Reconciliation 
customer to bank            account                        receipts from bank             by accountant 
 
 
Specifically, TWU entered into a contractual relationship with Tbilisi Power Utility (Telasi), 
which already had an established billing and collection system that would be able to 
implement billing, distribution and collection for TWU.  This new mechanism is based on 
the water bill arriving at the household along with its electricity bill from Telasi (both 
recorded on the same piece of paper); the household is then responsible for paying both 
bills at the bank.  This system does not involve any cash changing hands other than the 
payment from household directly into TWU’s bank account.  The involvement of outreach 
collectors was abandoned for residential collections and this has resulted in an 
immediate and substantial increase in collection rates. 
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2.7 Effects of the new system 
In 2002, the actual collection rate from residential customers was 32.2 per cent, in 2003 it 
was 31.7 per cent, in 2004 46 per cent while during the first five months of 2005 it had 
risen to 56 per cent.  The significant improvement since 2004 is obvious and can be 
attributed to the introduction of the new billing and collection system (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Improvement in collection rates, 2002-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 31
46
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Table 1. Improvement in collection rates; 2004 and 2005 data compared on a 
monthly basis 
 
Month Percentage increase in collection rates in 2005 
compared to same month of 2004 
January 22.3% 
February 17.4% 
March 30.7% 
April 14.5% 
 
Moreover, looking at monthly collection rates in 2004 convinced the researchers that the 
collection rates had actually improved from the specific month when the new billing was 
introduced, May 2004. During this month, the collection rate reached almost 60 per cent, 
an improvement of almost 80 per cent compared to the best previous result (37 per cent) 
of 2004 (see Figure 6). 
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Positive effects on the livelihoods of the population, especially in low-income areas 
of city that had previously experienced short hours of water supply 
Figure 6. Improvement in collection rates in 2004 
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So, how did the change in the billing and collection system result in such drastic 
improvements in collection rates?  The survey and interviews with the new management 
of Tbilisi Water Utility suggested the following two explanations: (1) The new system 
reduced on opportunities for corruption in the collection system, so all paid bills actually 
started to arrive to the provider’s account; and (2) the transparency of the new system 
created an incentive for people to pay their bills in the proper way, since clients recognize 
that their payments contribute directly to improvements in services (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Effects of the new system 
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2.8 Improved public opinion towards TWU and its services 
Respondents discussed their experience, as well as their knowledge and perceptions, of 
corruption. However, respondents were happy about there being fewer incentives and 
opportunities for such deals and that all their payments now reach the service provider 
and potentially translate into a greater capacity by the utility to deliver improved services. 
The survey suggested that 100 per cent of citizens recognized that corruption had 
decreased in the provision of infrastructure services in Tbilisi over the course of 2004 and 
the first half of 2005.  All of the respondents also suggested that they prefer the new 
water billing and payment system to the pre-2004 one.  Ninety-six per cent of the 
respondents believed corruption opportunities had substantially decreased. 
The study found that as of 2005, 69 per cent of respondents pay their water bills 
regularly, while 19 per cent pay irregularly.  Only 12 per cent admitted they do not pay 
their water bills at all.  Sixty-two per cent of respondents claimed not to have any debts 
on their water service account, while 38 per cent said they had some debt (see Table 2). 
This suggests substantial improvements in payment rates, as the study found that before 
the introduction of the new billing system only 17 per cent of respondents were paying 
their water bills regularly, 60 per cent were paying irregularly and 23 per cent were not 
paying for water at all.   
 
Table 2. Payment rates with the old and the new systems 
 
 With old system With current system 
Pays regularly 17% 69% 
Pays irregularly 60% 19% 
Does not pay 23% 12% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
It is evident from these results that most respondents who paid irregularly or did not pay 
their water bills with the old system, started to either pay regularly or at least irregularly; 
the number who do not pay their water bills has also decreased substantially.   
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Figure 8. Payment levels with the old and the new systems 
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While all of those who do not pay their water bills within the new system claimed the 
reason for non-payment to be poverty (they simply could not afford it), only 52 per cent of 
respondents who did not pay their bills within old system claimed this to be the reason for 
non-payment.  (see Figure 9).  The other 48 per cent claimed to be unsure the ‘system 
was transparent and that the payment would reach the service provider (water utility)’.  
All respondents consider the current system to be transparent and none doubt that their 
money reaches the intended recipient/service provider.  This fact points directly to 
increased customer trust in the new billing and payment system.  Customers no longer 
consider the system corrupt and non-transparent, which has translated into an increased 
willingness to pay and higher actual payment levels. 
All 100 per cent of respondents claimed to like the new system (no one claimed to prefer 
the previous system).  Forty-one per cent like it for being ‘transparent and for knowing 
that their payment reaches the water utility’s account directly’, and 59 per cent like it for 
being ‘convenient and for providing the opportunity to pay for water at once with the 
electricity bill’ (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 9. Reasons for non-payment  
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2.9 Evaluation of the mechanism 
The case study suggests that the introduction of the new transparent billing and 
collection system in water service provision in Tbilisi resulted in a rapid improvement in 
collection rates – these just a month after the introduction of the mechanism.  The design 
and introduction of the bill-based payment and bank-based collection system took a few 
months and limited human and financial resources, while its positive effects on the 
system are substantial.  Increased transparency in the billing and payment systems came 
as a result of computer-based bills and bank-based payments and earned immediate 
positive results because they provided fewer incentives and opportunities for corruption 
and improved public opinion towards the water utility; these translated into increased 
collection rates and hence improved cost-recovery and service delivery opportunities. 
As of 2005, the municipality and TWU were trying to reduce leaks by increasing funds 
targeted at rehabilitation of the system, maintenance and repair of water infrastructure.  
However, this does not address the problem of internal leaks within buildings or inside 
apartments.  In other words, the ongoing reform still fails to address the problem of high 
consumption and waste as the price is fixed per capita, rather than based on actual 
consumption. The municipality and TWU recognize the issue and understand that this 
problem could be dealt with by measuring consumption levels and introducing 
consumption-based payments.  However, as stated above, residential users are not 
provided with water meters in Tbilisi, and the municipality does not plan commencement 
of metering and the introduction of a meter-based payment system in the near future.   
In addition, the reforms remain unable to enforce collections, as the current system does 
not allow for measures to be taken against non-payment.  For example, the current 
system and mechanisms do not allow disconnection of non-paying customers, therefore 
despite the improvements this report has identified, incentives for paying for water 
services are still low.   
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3. New funding arrangements for repair of multi-storey 
housing stock in Tbilisi   
 
3.1 Setting the context 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, privatization of apartments in multi-storey housing 
stock was among the reforms that touched upon the lives of a majority of Tbilisi’s 
households directly; over 95 per cent of the city’s population resides in multi-storey 
apartment buildings.  The Decree of Cabinet of Ministers On Privatization of Apartments 
of February 1, 1992, allowed for the privatization of apartments by resident households 
for a nominal (very low) fee.  As a result, 86.6 per cent of apartments in multi-storey 
apartment buildings had been privatized by 1999.   
However, the enabling legislation was not the result of a specific housing policy with all 
issues considered and addressed in a systematic way.  Specifically, while the 
privatization of apartments proceeded at an accelerating rate, the issue of ownership and 
responsibility for common areas in multi-storey apartment buildings had neither been 
considered nor addressed.  The transfer of housing stock from the government to the 
private sector took place without any consideration given to the status and condition of 
that stock.  None of the buildings had been repaired or renovated before the transfer; 
therefore some citizens received apartments that were in poor condition. Such people 
failed to realize the risks associated with becoming owners of apartments in buildings 
that were in such bad shape and that required major investment. 
While in the Civil Code of 1997 addressed the issue of housing associations and allowed 
joint ownership and shared responsibility (paragraphs 200–232 of the law), the 
government did not facilitate the creation of such associations.  Citizens of Georgia who 
had become accustomed to the state taking care of their housing needs never realized or 
nor were educated about the new situation.  As a result, citizens failed to acknowledge 
joint ownership of common areas (such as roofs, elevators, basements, adjacent territory 
and so on) or responsibility for the maintenance of such areas.  People still expected the 
government to repair and maintain common areas in the building where their private 
apartments were located.  At the same time, the municipal government’s financial 
position did not allow it to allocate sufficient resources to deal with accumulated problems 
in such areas.  This resulted in the drastic deterioration of multi-storey housing stock in 
Tbilisi.    
While the civil code has specifically allowed the formation, registration and functioning of 
homeowners’ associations in 1997, the creation of such associations was not put into 
practice until 2004, when the Tbilisi government created specific incentives to facilitate 
their formation.  Prior to 2004, there were several isolated cases of homeowners’ 
associations, sponsored and facilitated by international organizations.  Specifically, the 
first such case was that of six associations created by the U.S. organization The Urban 
Institute under funding from USAID in Zestaponi, a secondary city in Western Georgia, 
with the goal of creating a successful showpiece to be replicated in other cities around 
the country.   
Prior to 2004, Tbilisi municipality had also been allocating money for the repair of 
elevators and roofs of multi-storey residential buildings.  However, with a constant 
shortfall of resources the amounts allocated hardly covered even 5 per cent of those 
needed.  Once demand for such allocations exceeded supply, the selection of buildings 
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to be repaired became a non-transparent process.  The system of planning, 
procurement, implementation and quality control of repair works also lacked transparency 
and accountability.  This was the reason behind a major change in the system 
implemented by the new municipal government in 2004. 
 
3.2 Project funding mechanisms prior to 2004 
The Tbilisi municipality allocated funding in its budget for repair and maintenance of 
multi-storey housing stock annually; however, it could not afford to allocate even close to 
the amount required to respond to the growing demand.  The figures convinced the 
researchers that the demand prior to 2004 was not being met: in 2004, of the 
approximately 22,000 housing blocks in Tbilisi, 8,000 required immediate repair; of these, 
the municipality managed to fixjust 288 roofs and 178 elevators.   
Tbilisi is divided into 10 administrative districts called ‘gamgeoba’, and until 2004 the 
municipality used to distribute its building-block repair and maintenance budget among 
these. The gamgeoba were then responsible for implementing all phases of the repair 
and maintenance projects in their area.  Each gamgeoba used to receive around 
200,000GEL (approximately US$100,000). 
A resident or group of residents of a specific housing block used to file a written request 
for a repair – mainly to fix a leaking roof or non-functional elevator. The gamgeoba would 
have already contracted a construction company to do repair and maintenance works for 
the year, and a representative of that company would go and diagnose and evaluate the 
status of the problem and required intervention. Only in cases in which the company 
representative provided a positive review of the existing problem, did the building get 
onto that year’s maintenance list; basically the building’s ‘destiny was dependent on that 
specific individual’s decision.   
Where a review was successful, the company would calculate potential costs and then 
present the budget to the gamgeoba. Only after the vice-gamgebeli (deputy head of 
gamgeoba responsible for the housing and utilities sectors) had given the green light, 
would the project get onto the official schedule of works for that year, and budget was 
allocated.  Simultaneously, the information about the project (address, scope of work, 
size of allocation etc.) was provided to the capital construction department of the mayor’s 
office, which provided some management to project implementation. 
The construction company contracted was provided with a single-year, fixed price 
contract, so it had little incentive to price the project efficiently.  Neither was the validity of 
the project budget checked by the gamgeoba or the municipality, so the contractor was 
pretty much free to name any sum.  Thirty per cent of the project costs were transferred 
to the contractor in advance.  After completion of the project, a gamgeoba representative 
would visit the site to evaluate the work; if he or she provided a positive review, the 
contractor would receive the outstanding amount from the gamgeoba.   
There were no instances when the contractor’s work was evaluated negatively or the 
company was not paid or penalized.  Despite the fact that the municipality’s new 
management team deny any clear evidence of fraud, its analysis suggests costs were 
neither competitive nor efficient.  Lack of quality control is evident as of the buildings 
fixed in 2003 and 2004, 20 have reapplied to fix a roof or elevator that was fixed just a 
year before (the life expectancy of the roofs should have been seven years).  In addition, 
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comparison of costs incurred by the municipality in 2005 for the same type and scope of 
works suggests a drastic decrease.  
The new mayor (appointed by President Saakashvili in spring, 2004) recognized the old 
system as being corrupt, inefficient, non-transparent and lacking accountability. The new 
system has been designed and introduced since mid-2004 to respond to these problems. 
 
3.3 Current practice 
The municipality addressed inefficiency and non-transparency in the maintenance and 
repair of multi-storey housing stock in systematic way.  It introduced major institutional 
reform in the area and completely changed the procedures and mechanisms through 
which maintenance and repair were applied for, selected, funded, implemented and 
evaluated.  The process started with the formation of a new unit in the municipality called 
Tbilisi Corps, which is responsible for management of the process.   
The new procedure envisages provision of funding by the municipality (through Tbilisi 
Corps) based on applications made by homeowners’ associations (HOAs). Therefore, a 
precondition to funding a project is the creation and registration of a homeowners’ 
association, which is a legal entity under private law.  Another difference is that the 
association itself evaluates the cost of the project and designs the scope of work.  After 
residents are mobilized into an association and the application is submitted, Tbilisi Corps 
reviews the application and provides a grant to the HOA for any necessary repairs. The 
HOA then becomes responsible for hiring a contractor and supervising the works in place 
of the gamgeoba and its contractor.  
The provision of a grant to the HOA introduces substantial transparency and 
accountability mechanisms into the whole process.  The application (scope of work and 
costs), recruiting of a contractor and payment for and quality control of the works all 
involve the official participation of members of the association, in most cases them 
signing papers approving the project at various stages.  In addition, the HOA is requested 
to co-finance the project with 25 per cent of total costs on elevator projects and 15 per 
cent on roof projects.  This takes away any incentive to increase the costs artificially; 
rather, there is a clear incentive to keep the costs low so that each resident’s share is 
correspondingly low.  Because the HOA is motivated to accomplish the works at the 
lowest possible price, there are no incentives or opportunities for corruption.   
This new system improves the efficiency of the municipality, which is able to accomplish 
more projects with same budget and can increase the number of completed projects.  
More households experience a positive change in their physical environment and, 
correspondingly, more poor residents also see positive results. 
During the first five months of 2005, the municipality received applications for 1,187 
building repairs.  The number of applications has been increasing every month:  in April 
there were 220 applications; in May 237; in June 320; and in July 410.  As of June 2005, 
30 per cent of works based on received applications had been accomplished (361 
projects). 
In 2004, when the new system was introduced and HOAs started to emerge, the number 
of completed projects was lower. The 2005 figures assured the researchers of the 
popularity of the system and of growing trust and demand on the part of the public. The 
budget for 2005 was 2, 230,000GEL (approximately 180,000GEL per month). This was 
higher than the 2004 budget.  By September 2005 854 homeowners’ associations had 
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already been created in Tbilisi. While until then multi-storey housing stock repair and 
maintenance had been concentrated on the roofs and elevators, the municipality plans to 
expand such works to water and sanitation infrastructure and backyards.  
The Draft Law on Homeowners Associations was prepared and to be submitted before 
parliament during its autumn 2005 sessions. 
 
3.3.1 Public education campaign and technical assistance to HOAs 
Tbilisi Corps advertises its programme widely and is involved in an intensive public 
education campaign in order to inform people of opportunities to repair their multi-story 
apartment buildings.  Many television programmes and newspaper articles have covered 
the issue.  In addition, with funding from the GTZ land management programme, Tbilisi 
Corps has designed and published a guidebook on the creation of homeowners’ 
associations.  This is a comprehensive publication, explaining not only each step 
required to form and register a homeowners’ association and to design an application for 
funding, but also guiding the reader through the steps necessary in project management 
and oversight, as well as suggesting the benefits of such an approach and prospects for 
the future of HOAs.   
In addition, Tbilisi Corps’s representatives are actively involved in providing technical 
assistance  (TA) to HOAs in the early stages of their formation and existence.  According 
to Tbilisi Corps, they have 200 visitors per day in average. 
Another important innovation is recruitment of volunteers by Tbilisi Corps.  The existence 
of volunteers guarantees more technical assistance to HOAs, more citizens approached 
as part of the educational campaign and also improves the transparency of procedures.  
This initiative is funded by the European Commission.  
3.3.2 Application procedures 
The application forms are publicly available for the HOAs to collect from Tbilisi Corps’s 
office.  Each comprises a brief (three-page) form requesting the following information: 
date; title and address of HOA; HOA chairman or woman’s name and contact 
information; an indication of the work object (the elevator or roof, for example); a 
description of the existing problem/condition; the scope of works; the project timeframe; 
the costs and cost-sharing suggestions; the title, contact information and bank 
information of the partner/contractor; and the names, contact information and signatures 
of the HOA members.   
After the HOA is formed and registered and the application form submitted, Tbilisi Corps 
reviews the application and assigns it scores based on the overall scope of the project 
and the suggested cost-sharing arrangement.   
 
3.4 Anticorruption mechanisms 
The service provider – the municipality and Tbilisi Corps – considers that by introducing 
the new funding system it has diminished corruption opportunities in the system 
substantially.  This is mainly because it has shifted responsibility for the design, cost 
estimation and management of implementation of the project to the HOA.  Below the 
major anticorruption remedies of the system are outlined: 
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• The system does not allow for illegal deals (bribes) between municipal employees and 
citizens for providing a grant to an HOA.  The availability of funding for the HOA is 
based on clear merits: (1) the HOA should be registered; and (2) those projects that 
suggest higher cost sharing, win the grant.   
• The system has an incentive for keeping the costs of each project at a reasonable 
level and does not provide the opportunity for illegal deals that might top up the real 
cost. It is in the HOA’s interest to keep the cost of a project as low as possible, as it is 
obliged to co-finance.  The lower the cost, the lower the co-funding level and the cost 
paid by every household.   
• It is the HOA’s responsibility to select the contractor for repair works; therefore, the 
system does not provide opportunities for corrupt deals between municipal workers 
and private companies. 
• It is in the HOA’s best interests to oversee project implementation: to keep control 
over the quality of materials, the qualities used and the overall quality of work.  
Therefore, the system does not provide an opportunity for the construction company 
to do a poor job.  
The results of these anticorruption mechanisms are evident in various ways:   
• A substantial reduction in the cost of a standard project.  According to Tbilisi Corps, 
the cost of a standard elevator project (fixing an elevator) has decreased from 
10,000–20,000GEL in 2003–04 to 5,000GEL in 2005; 
• Increased public satisfaction with the quality of works, the financial aspects of the 
project and the contractor’s performance; 
• An increased number of projects, which allows the municipality to address problems in 
a greater number of buildings; this in turn has a broader effect on the quality of life of 
the population. 
 
 
3.5 Citizen satisfaction with the current system 
Public opinions towards the system proved to be identical to those of the provider.  
Despite the fact that knowledge of the system was not extremely high (only 53 per cent of 
respondents knew about it), nearly all respondents (92 per cent) who knew about it 
strongly preferred the new system to the old one.  Of those familiar with both the previous 
and current systems, 100 per cent believed the previous system had provided incentives 
and opportunities for corruption and had been in fact corrupt, while only 1 per cent 
thought the current system was providing such incentives and opportunities (see Figure 
9).  Those who made these claims could not specify where gaps or problems in the new 
system exist. 
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Figure 10. Public opinions towards corruption in the current and previous 
systems 
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The survey also revealed higher satisfaction on the part of residents with projects 
completed under the new system, as compared to under the prior system (see Figure 
10).  The HOA residents were found to be satisfied to a substantially higher degree with 
the quality of works than residents of buildings repaired under previous system (88 per 
cent as against 18 per cent), with expenditure (85 per cent as against 6 per cent), as well 
as with contractor performance (82 per cent compared to 28 per cent).  
A substantial proportion (38 per cent) of HOA building residents indicated that they 
participated to some degree either in designing the project application, selecting the 
contractor or in project management.  The vast majority – 77 per cent – of all HOA 
building residents knew what the repair project cost, while just 1 per cent of residents of 
buildings repaired under the previous system had any idea of the cost of the project in 
their building.  Residents of HOAs claimed that a group of residents mainly oversaw the 
works, while in earlier repaired buildings the vast majority of citizens did not know who 
was responsible for or who actually oversaw the works.   
 
Figure 11.  Public satisfaction with repair works completed in their buildings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Happy with
quality of works
Happy w ith
project
expenditures
Happy w ith
contractors
performance
Previous system
Current system
 
 
 
  23
Apparently, the works accomplished during the previous system did not follow quality 
standards as according to Tbilisi Corps many of the roofs and elevators fixed by the 
municipality’s contractor were out of order and required fixing no more than 18 months 
after completion of the project.   
Statistics suggest that the popularity of the current system in gradually increasing: there 
were 17 applications in March 2005, 220 applications in April, 230 in May and 320 in 
June. 
 
3.6 Effects on livelihoods of citizens, including those on low incomes 
Introducing a new approach to the financing and implementation of repair of common 
areas of multi-storey apartment stock has had an important positive effect on the 
livelihoods of the poor.  It is commonly known that the quality of his or her residence is 
one of the key determinants of an individual’s quality of life and plays an important role in 
determining poverty levels.  The condition of common areas of multi-storey apartment 
buildings – in terms of roof leakage, a broken elevator etc. – greatly determines the 
overall quality of the residence and therefore quality of life.  By increasing the budget for 
repairs of multi-storey apartment blocks, Tbilisi municipality has addressed existing 
demand and the number of implemented projects has increased substantially since mid-
2004 (see Table 3). 
Table 3. 2004 data for Tbilisi Corps’s repair projects 
March, 2004 
# District of Tbilisi Roof Elevator HOA GEL % 
1 Isani-Samgori 2 (1441m2) 3 4 8258.75 8% 
2 Mtsatsminda-Krtsanisi 0 0 0 0 0% 
3 Didube-Chugureti 2 (319m2) 3 5 14330.44 14% 
4 Vake_saburTalo 2 (3775m2) 4 3 38228.11 38% 
5 Gldani-Nadzaladevi 0 3 3 40207.1 40% 
  6 (5535m2) 13 15 101024.4  
       
April, 2004 
# District of Tbilisi Roof Elevator HOA GEL % 
1 Isani-Samgori 9 (7920m2) 5 13 69382.55 26% 
2 Mtsatsminda-Krtsanisi 0 1 1 8625 3% 
3 Didube-Chugureti 2 (700m2) 2 4 11763.05 4% 
4 Vake_saburTalo 11 (6686m2) 3 14 69042.53 26% 
5 Gldani-Nadzaladevi 12 (9119m2) 11 19 103685.77 39% 
  34 (24425m2) 22 51 262498.9  
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May, 2004 
# District of Tbilisi Roof Elevator HOA GEL % 
1 Isani-Samgori 14 (7639m2) 8 18 111819.75 27% 
2 Mtsatsminda-Krtsanisi 1 (410m2) 0 1 8857 2% 
3 Didube-Chugureti 6 (4554m2) 0 6 59531.47 15% 
4 Vake_saburTalo 15 (10157m2) 3 17 138928.95 34% 
5 Gldani-Nadzaladevi 9 (7547m2) 8 15 90344.9 22% 
  45 (30307m2) 19 57 409482.1  
 
By introducing anticorruption mechanisms into the system of application, selection and 
implementation of the projects, the municipality managed to decrease the cost of projects 
and therefore managed to accomplish more projects for the same range of funding.  
Residents of the buildings in low-income areas are more in need of grants/municipal 
funding for the repair of their buildings, as compared to residents of buildings located in 
high-income areas.  Gldani-Nadzaladevi represents one of the lowest-income areas of 
Tbilisi and Table 3 above clearly suggests that during March–May, 2004, most money 
was spent on the projects in this particular district.  Specifically, 40 per cent of funding 
was spent in this district in March, 39 per cent in April and 22 per cent in May.  This 
means that residents of lower income areas are highly motivated to form HOAs and 
obtain funding for repair of their buildings, even with the co-financing option. This 
represents an important part of improving the quality of their residences and hence their 
lives.   
In addition, the introduction of new accountability and responsibility mechanisms through 
the active involvement of HOAs in the design and implementation process guarantees 
better quality of works and thus a longer lifespan for the roof or elevator (see Figure 12). 
While this research did not identify any cases of corruption by HOA members or their 
heads (chairs), such possibilities do potentially exist.  At the same time, the system is 
very young and it is difficult to judge some issues that will become clearer as time 
passes.  
Another issue for consideration is the fact that while HOAs have to part-finance projects 
amounting to 15–25 per cent of the cost of the project. This may have negative effects on 
poor households, which may not be able to pay or in cases of payment may find 
themselves in financial difficulties as a result.  The research identified that in some cases 
lower income households were not able to share HOA contributions at all, and such 
instances are dealt with on an individual basis in each HOA.  In many cases, where 
poorer households were clearly identified by HOA members, other tenants agreed to 
cover such households’s share of the contribution.  Once again, this varies case by case 
and there is no clearly set mechanism for dealing with the issue. 
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Figure 12. Effects of the new system 
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4. New property registration system  
 
4.1 Setting the context 
One of the most important reforms undertaken as part of the new regime’s overhaul of 
the public sector and institutions in Georgia during the post-2003 Rose Revolution period, 
has been reform of the property registration system.  Started in early 2004 and 
completed by the end of that year, this reform has also been one of the most radical. 
Private ownership of land and real estate was introduced in Georgia in 1992.  The 
Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers On Privatization of Apartments of February 1, 1992, 
allowed for privatization of apartments by resident households for a nominal fee.  As a 
result, 86.6 per cent of apartments in multi-storey apartment buildings had been 
privatized by 1999.  Registration and titling of land and connected buildings was also 
among the major reforms of Georgia’s state sector during the late 1990s.  Mass 
privatization of agricultural land commenced in 1996 with land registration legislation.  
Private ownership of land and housing also facilitated the significant development of 
secondary (resale) markets during the first decade of Georgia’s independence, especially 
during the period 2000–2004.   
The land and immovable property titling and registration of rights have contributed to 
poverty reduction in several ways.  First, ownership of land and real estate is an 
important non-income-related indicator of quality of life.  Therefore, during the 1990s, 
when a substantial section of Georgia’s population lost jobs and other income sources, 
obtaining title to privatized land and/or an apartment represented an extremely important 
psychological factor as well as an economic opportunity for citizens, especially those in 
low-income households. 
Secondly, the ease with which people can secure rights to property determines access to 
credit, as mortgage lending is greatly dependent on this factor. Facilitation of access to 
credit is acknowledged to be among the key poverty reduction factors. The ease with 
which citizens and businesses can actually register such rights to property, both movable 
and immovable, (i.e. real estate) is also a key determinant of their access to mortgage 
lending.   
Citizen mobility is an important factor for a country like Georgia, where employment and 
other economic opportunities are limited and the number living below the poverty line is 
high (around 50 per cent in recent years).  Hence the ease with which it is possible to buy 
or sell property and register movable and immovable property rights is also an important 
factor in determining the degree to which citizens are mobile.  
As a result of the above factors, reform of the property registration system – that is, the 
introduction of transparency and accountability mechanisms, simplification of procedures 
and reducing the costs and time required for registration of property rights – was an 
important initiative that affected large numbers of population.  It involved two major laws: 
the Law on Public Registry and the Law on Registration of Rights on Immovable 
Property, both adopted in 2004. 
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4.2 Review of the pre-2004 system  
Prior to 2004, the Law on Land Registration of November 1996 determined systems, 
institutional mechanisms and procedures for registration of property and registration and 
titling of land and other estate.  Responsibility for providing an inventory and titling of land 
and associated buildings was given to the local government’s Bureaus of Technical 
Inventory under guidelines set out by Georgia’s Ministry of Urbanization and 
Construction.  The Law stipulated that the data be provided and maintained by the Public 
Registry of the State Department of Land Management (SDLM).  SDLM was responsible 
overall for property registration throughout Georgia.  However, the country was divided 
into registration zones (according to the administrative regions of country) and each zone 
was equipped with a registry responsible for: 
• Registration of land and associated buildings; 
• Compilation and archiving of a cadastral map (a map showing the extent, value and 
ownership of land) and registration documents; 
• Archiving of all agreements and documents for acts associated with changes in 
property ownership; and 
• Provision of information and/or ownership certificates detailing any technical 
characteristics of property and land. 
Every registry contained a registration card for land and other real estate, as well as 
registration maps.  Information contained on the registration card was the major source 
for determining the legal status of the title.   
 
4.3 Description of newly introduced anticorruption mechanisms 
The new system of land and property registration was introduced in 2004. The new 
government dissolved the State Agency for Land Management (which had been 
established in 1996) and distributed its functions between several new agencies.  The 
National Agency of Public Registry (NAPR) was created by the Law on Public Registry of 
June 1, 2004, as an entity under public law and was brought into a hierarchically 
accountable system and made responsible to the Ministry of Justice.  Such subordination 
introduced rigorous vertical accountability mechanisms so as to assure quality.  NAPR  
has 68 territorial offices (in accordance with the number of former Bureaus of Technical 
Inventory). 
The Public Registry Law determined the transfer of the SDLM property, information 
database, budget and staff to the National Agency of Public Registry within a month.  The 
Law also determined the liquidation of the Bureaus of Technical Inventory (BTIs) and 
passing of all their property, information databases, budgets and staff to the NAPR’s 
territorial offices within three months.   
Further, several other important laws were adopted including Order No.1102 (September 
10, 2004) of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia On Approval of Regulations on 
Registration of Movable Property Rights, and a specific legal act of that same year on 
fees for services provided by the National Agency for Public Registry.  These laws 
established mechanisms and fees for services provided by the Public Registry.  
Accordingly, fees are paid for the following services of NAPR: registration of property, 
registration of primary and secondary rights on immovable property, registration of 
primary and secondary rights on movable property and information services.  The laws 
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also establish mechanisms and rules for ‘speeded-up services:’ primary registration 
within one, three or five days; sale of property, with passage within one to three days; 
and mortgage registration in one day.  
In addition, the law sets the following payment rates and terms of registration: 
• Registration of agricultural land: ten days with no fee; 
• Registration of non-agricultural land: ten days with  36GEL (equivalent to US$20) 
payable; 
• Speeded-up non-agricultural land registration: one day for a payment of 150GEL, 
three days for 108GEL or five days for 72GEL; 
• Registration of transfer of property rights:   
o agricultural land: within five days for 7GEL; 
- speeded-up services: one day for 35GEL or three days for 21GEL; 
o non-agricultural land: five days for 36GEL; 
- speeded-up services: one day for 150GEL or three days for 108GEL; 
o mortgage registration: three days for 50GEL; 
- speeded-up registration: one day for 250GEL. 
Similarly, the law sets tariffs and terms for all other services, including provision of 
information.  Distinguishing and clearly setting specific tariffs and terms for regular and 
speeded-up services prevents illegal deals between clients and registry officials.  Citizens 
who need to obtain documents or services unusually quickly do not need to bribe a public 
servant; rather, they can legally pay the official fee.  Incentives and opportunities for 
corruption have substantially decreased as a consequence.  Anecdotally, the bribes that 
customers were paying before the reforms in order to obtain prompt services, such as 
documents for the registration of a property transfer, were substantially higher than the 
official fee for the one-day service, which in this case is 150GEL (approximately US$80).  
The bribe for this service used to be US$120 or higher, and even in such cases where 
payment of this illegal fee was made it was still difficult to obtain the necessary 
documents in one day.   
As of mid-2005, the BTIs had transferred all information to the National Agency of Public 
Registry, meaning that the number of institutions/agencies citizens have to deal with in 
order to obtain services has decreased.  All the data in now centralized within the Public 
Registry.  This is another important mechanism that avoids faulty sales of property – for 
instance, a number of cases occurred previously in Georgia when the tenant (as opposed 
to the owner) of a property sold it illegally, or the owner of a property made money by 
selling it to many different buyers.  Such were the risks associated with the former faulty 
and unreliable system of registration, which created public scepticism towards the public 
institutions responsible.   
One of the early responsibilities of the Public Registry has been the creation of a central 
database of the information held by the regional offices of the former SDLM.  
Computerization of the Public Registry system and creation of electronic databases of all 
transactions has also come to represent an important transparency and accountability 
mechanism.  In addition, computerization affects the quality of services positively – in 
terms of speed of service provision and reliability of graphical information. 
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Computerizing the registration book of applications and establishing an electronic record 
of application registration numbers also prevents public registry employees bypassing the 
proper sequence of applications and so providing a service based on favouritism, 
nepotism or fraud/corruption.  Every application is recorded electronically in the 
application registration book so preventing any opportunities for breaking with the correct 
chronological order  – shortening service provision times for some clients while extending 
official deadlines for others.   
Movable property rights mechanisms have also been streamlined, so easing the 
registration process and providing increased access to credit for citizens. Access to credit 
is an important aspect of increasing economic opportunities, improving quality of life and 
reducing overall poverty.   
The Registry widely publicizes information about procedures, fees, time frames and other 
details of registration. For instance, the NAPR website (www.napr.gov.ge) provides 
detailed information about each procedure. The necessary documents and steps 
required for each procedure are also listed on the site, as are electronic versions of 
application forms.  People can print and fill out application forms from the site, so 
avoiding a visit to NAPR and saving time and resources. 
 
4.4 Evaluation of the anticorruption mechanisms 
Based on 2004 data, a co-publication of the World Bank, International Finance 
Corporation and Oxford University Press, Doing Business Survey for 2005 suggests that 
it takes eight procedures and 39 days to register property in Georgia (with a fee of 2.5 
per cent of the property value).3   
This time period for property registration in Georgia was less than for previous years, but 
was still slightly higher than the OECD average of 34 days.  Ease of registering a 
property is taken as a simple average of all country rankings by number of procedures, 
time and cost.  Based on 2005 data, the Doing Business Survey for 2006 declared that 
‘Georgia was the runner-up reformer’4 and is among the top five countries in the region in 
terms of time needed to register property,5 which by 2005 had fallen to nine days. This is 
incredible achievement in just one year, as the time needed to register a property has 
fallen by 75 per cent and the cost by 70 per cent.6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
3
 Doing Business in 2005 (2004).  The World Bank, International Finance Corporation and Oxford 
University Press, p.108.  
4
 Doing Business in 2006 (2005).  The World Bank and International Finance Corporation, p.1.  
5
 World Bank Hails Georgia as Number 2 Reformer in the World. The Messenger, September 13, 2005. 
6
 Doing Business in 2006 (2005).  The World Bank and International Finance Corporation, p.2. 
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4.5 Positive effects of the reforms to service users, including the poor 
 
The major changes introduced into the system of property registration can be 
summarized as follows: 
• Fewer institutions are now involved in the registration process, which saves time and 
resources for citizens requiring the service. 
• The number of steps and time required for registration of property rights or for 
obtaining official information from the Public Registry has been reduced; 
• The official fees to obtain regular services from the Public Registry have been 
reduced;  
• Internal accountability mechanisms have been introduced.  Specifically, 
computerization of the system means that an electronic application registration book 
and an electronic record of application registration numbers are now kept; 
• Public access to information about services, fees and procedures required for 
obtaining various Public Registry services has improved; this eases the process of 
obtaining such services.  For instance, NAPR has a website providing all details of 
procedures and electronic application forms;  
• Overall international indicators of registration of property in Georgia have improved. 
• The centralization of a database of information on property and land ownership, 
property transactions and so on within the Public Registry has been an important 
transparency mechanism. 
As outlined below, 2004’s improved system of property rights registration has had 
positive effects on the livelihoods of the poor.  Despite a lack of evidence for such effects, 
the researchers are able to make this assumption based on the reform’s overall benefits 
for population as a whole, which are listed below (also see Figure 13): 
• Incentives for clients to pay bribes in order to obtain a speedy service have been 
reduced; this means the financial costs (in terms of official and unofficial payments) of 
obtaining services, as well as the time costs (in terms of the number of trips required 
to various institutions) have reduced. 
• Opportunities for corrupt deals have been reduced by the introduction of internal 
accountability mechanisms.   
• The system has allowed improved access to mortgage lending and credit in general. 
• The introduction of transparent and simple registration mechanisms contributes to the 
development of land and property secondary markets and also supports greater 
mobility of citizens. 
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Figure 13. Institutional reforms and their effects  
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The reduction in the cost of services, increased access to credit and increased citizen 
mobility are the most substantial and important factors affecting lower-income citizens. 
Hence the researchers feel able to make the assumption that improved property rights 
registration has had an important influence on the livelihoods of the poor. 
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5. Generic lessons to be learned from the cases  
 
The Georgian government’s commitment to the implementation of a major anticorruption 
policy since November 2003 has been translated into highly specific, utility-level and 
institution-based systems and mechanisms of accountability.  Some of these reforms 
were initiated at the central-government level, while others at the municipal level.  In 
many cases, accountability mechanisms were introduced in a short period of time, 
without any legislative or regulatory amendments and without having to invest major 
financial or human resources.   
As outlined in the three case studies above, the introduction of these new mechanisms of 
accountability has increased the transparency of provision of the infrastructure services 
discussed, which in turn has resulted in decreasing corruption and increasing efficiency 
in service provision.  Similarly, the case studies have shown that the introduction of 
accountability mechanisms has also resulted in improved public opinions towards specific 
service-provider institutions. 
In conclusion, an analysis of the research findings suggests that the following 
mechanisms result in positive effects in the provision of infrastructure services: 
• The introduction of computerized billing and collections systems; 
• The initiation of bank-based payment systems for infrastructure services; 
• The facilitation of public participation and responsibility in community-based projects; 
• Decreasing the opportunities available for discretionary decisions by public and 
municipal officials through the introduction of clear criteria for decision-making; and  
• Increasing access to information by the public. 
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